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Why	public	sector	outsourcing	is	less	efficient	than
Soviet	central	planning
Since	the	1990s,	public	sector	outsourcing	has	evolved	through	competitive	tendering,	partnership
working	(particularly	via	Public	Finance	Initiatives),	strategic-commissioning	and	prime-contracting.
Each	of	these	iterations	has	promised	better	public	goods	and	services	for	less	cost.	Their	practice,
however,	has	frequently	been	marked	by	rising	costs	and	lower	service	quality.	Abby	Innes	explains
why.
The	logic	of	outsourcing	is	that	market-based	production	is	better	than	public	production	because	the	governance	of
private	organisations	is	more	transparent,	flexible,	efficiency	focused	and	disciplined	by	owners.	But	this	idea	is
problematic	on	two	fronts.	In	the	first	place	the	presumption	of	market	superiority	is	an	artefact	of	public	choice
theory;	it’s	not	rooted	in	historical	assessment	of	which	regime,	public	or	private,	has	better	produced	public	goods.
In	the	second,	this	logic	is	dependent	on	‘first-best-world’	economic	theorising:	it	assumes	an	efficient	market	for
simple	goods,	or	for	goods	that	can	be	somehow	simplified.	Hence	for	outsourcing	to	work	those	archetypal
conditions	have	to	exist.	While	they	typically	can	exist	for	simple	goods	and	services	(the	NHS	doesn’t	grow	its	own
food),	the	outsourcing	markets	for	complex	goods	and	services	characteristically	fulfil	none	of	the	necessary
conditions.
The	neoclassical	microeconomic	logic	behind	outsourcing	operates	according	to	purely	deductive-theoretic
reasoning:	i.e.	in	chains	of	logical	reasoning	that	flow	from	explicit	axioms	to	necessary	outcomes,	like	Pythagoras’s
theorem.	This	method	allows	for	the	valuable	modelling	of	‘small-world’,	repetitive	and	simple	transactions	but	around
the	essential,	complex	and	interdependent	services	of	the	state	it	introduces	some	heinous	sins	of	analytical
omission.	This	is	a	form	of	argument	that	does	not	calibrate	itself	against	observable	reality	as	in	other	social
sciences,	including	more	critical	neoclassical	economics,	but	with	the	axiomatic	reasoning	or	maths	that	‘proves’	it.
Around	complex	goods	and	services,	however,	reality	conspires	to	render	an	efficient	market	impossible.
When	we	put	the	market	rhetoric	of	New	Public	Management	to	one	side	outsourcing	constitutes	the	central	planning
of	private	businesses,	and	the	success	of	this	venture	hinges	on	the	viability	of	the	outsourcing	contract	as	an
effective	junction	of	instruction	and	control.	What	contract	theory	tells	us	is	that	the	more	complex	the	service	or
good,	the	longer	the	duration	of	the	contract	and	the	greater	the	contingencies	or	uncertainties	that	the	supplier	might
face,	the	less	the	outsourced	tasks	are	amenable	to	codification	and	hence	to	robust	contracts	that	can	adequately
protect	the	buyer.
Such	‘incomplete’	contracts	create	unanticipated	and	destined	to	be	high	costs	for	the	management	and	supervision
of	the	‘non–contractible’	elements	relating	to	service	delivery.	Frequent	contractual	failures	require	repeated	(and
given	a	poor	bargaining	position)	expensive	renegotiation.	Complexity,	shifting	needs	and	interdependency	are
conditions	endemic	within	public	service	goods	and	services.
The	economics	of	Soviet	central	planning	tells	us	that	the	resulting	asymmetries	in	information	and	leverage	between
state	and	producer	are	just	the	start	of	bargaining	games	that	the	state	cannot	win.	Given	public	funding	the	state
remains	both	the	only	partner	in	the	market	relationship	however	numerous	the	‘end	users’	or	rhetorical	‘customers’
may	be,	but	also	the	continuous	bearer	of	the	contractual	obligations	and	financial,	legal	and	political	liabilities	and
costs	of	a	failed	supplier:	a	position	unique	to	the	state.
The	following	market	failures	are	rife	in	public	service	markets:	high	barriers	to	entry	leave	public	service	markets
dominated	by	monopoly	or	oligopoly	firms	which	render	the	provider	relatively	immune	from	the	self–correcting
mechanisms	of	market	competition;	uncertainty	and	complexities	in	contractual	requirements	create	huge	information
asymmetries	between	buyer	and	seller;	relationship–specific	investments	encourage	the	producer	to	exploit	the	loss
of	bargaining	power	entailed	by	sunk	costs	(i.e.	‘hold-up’	problems);	and	finally,	negative	spillovers,	that	is	to	say,
damaging	external	effects	not	reflected	in	the	original	price	of	the	transaction	are	particularly	problematic	given
systemic	interdependencies,	for	example	between	NHS	and	social	care	systems.
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The	negative	spillovers	from	incomplete	contracts	in	public	service	outsourcing	are	exceptionally	socially	damaging.
The	hard	to	codify	tasks	often	intrinsic	to	a	given	public	service	–	like	‘care’	–	are	rationally	sloughed	off	by	private
providers	and	left	to	families,	volunteers,	charities	and	other	public	services	to	answer.	As	interdependent	services
come	under	satisficing	corporate	performance,	systemic	failures	become	inevitable.
The	GCHQ	building	in	Cheltenham	was	built	and	maintained	by	Carillion,	which	went	into	compulsory	liquidation	in	2018,
Credit:	GCHQ	(Crown	Copyright)
The	almost	completely	compromised	nature	of	the	marketplace	for	services	is	not	the	only	problem,	however.	As
Accounting	Professor	Adam	Lever	and	Gil	Plimmer’s	coverage	at	the	Financial	Times	have	shown,	large	public
service	industry	(PSI)	firms	are	a	particularly	striking	example	of	‘financialised’	corporations:	they	are	not	the
productive	innovators	of	the	neoclassical	imaginary.	Rather	than	reinvesting	their	profits,	these	quoted	companies
redirect	earnings	into	ever	increasing	dividend	payouts	and	share	buybacks	to	further	hike	share	prices,	and	debt-
funded	mergers	and	acquisitions	are	relied	on	to	create	new	income	streams.	On	the	verge	of	bankruptcy	in	2013,
the	new	CEO	of	Serco	found	it	had	no	single	coherent	register	documenting	its	700	businesses,	suggesting	the
operating	values	of	a	Ponzi	scheme	more	than	a	value-creating	corporate	strategy.
With	few	tangible	assets	and	high	borrowing	against	intangible	assets,	(like	brand	recognition	and,	presumably,	the
financial	market	expectation	of	an	ever-expanding	non-competitive	sector	under	doctrinaire	governments)	these	firms
carry	no	residual	value	if	the	business	fails.	Failure	is	also	hard	to	anticipate	since	due	diligence	is	hampered	by
major	conflicts	of	interest	in	the	‘Big	Four’	accountancy	companies,	KPMG,	Pricewaterhouse	Coopers,	Deloitte	and
Ernst	and	Young.	Leaver	describes	the	standard	financial	model	as	“leveraged	gambling	on	future	income	flows”.
The	policy	is	thus	booby-trapped	against	governments	keen	to	reverse	it.
When	it	comes	to	prevailing	incentives,	public	service	industry	firms	as	‘firms’	bear	an	uncanny	resemblance	to
Soviet	state-owned	enterprises	(SOEs)	and	why	wouldn’t	they?	As	within	planning	for	the	Soviet	SOEs,	the
outsourcing	contract	operates	as	a	form	of	planning	instruction	and	as	an	imperative	to	be	realised,	not	as	a	forecast
or	‘indicative	plan’	to	be	considered;	prices	are	predominantly	administrative	and	‘soft’	(i.e.	negotiable);	contracts	are
typically	long,	incomplete	and	exit	is	punitively	expensive	financially,	organisationally	and	politically;	the	continuation
of	production	is	essential,	hence	government	operates	under	risks	of	a	chronically	‘soft’	budget	per	contract	(so-
called	‘soft	budget	constraints’).
The	relationship	is	intrinsically	and	institutionally	politicised:	in	the	UK	case,	following	repeated	failures,	the	Cabinet
Office	operates	as	the	direct	interface	with	major	outsourcing	companies.	Demand	for	the	good	or	service	is	typically
guaranteed	(disabled	citizens	seeking	their	independence	allowance	aren’t	shopping	for	a	handbag).	Like	Soviet
SOEs	then,	public	service	industry	firms	operate	in	a	doom	loop	of	low	incentives	for	consummate	performance,	high
incentives	for	satisficing	performance,	plus	a	lack	of	effective	disciplinary	mechanisms.
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As	a	result,	the	typical	multinational	PSI	firm	looks	more	like	the	separated-at-birth	twin	of	the	Soviet	‘Kombinat’
business	group	than	either	a	prizewinning	public	corporation	like	the	BBC	or	an	archetypal	plucky,	innovative,	value-
creating	enterprise	(characteristic	of	actual	small	and	medium	sized	enterprises	far	more	than	today’s	financialised
quoted	companies).	As	of	2016	the	vast	majority	of	UK	outsourcing	contracts	had	nevertheless	been	awarded	to
large	public	service	industry	multinational	firms	–	some	73%	of	procurement	spending.	Under	doctrinaire
governments,	PSI	firms,	like	Soviet	SOEs,	benefit	from	an	increasingly	all-embracing	nomenclature	of	commodities
to	be	produced.	In	contrast	to	the	Soviet	system,	however,	money	is	anything	but	passive	within	the	outsourcing
production	regime.
From	the	taxpayer’s	point	of	view,	the	contemporary	outsourcing	architecture	is	more	dysfunctional	in	framing
corporate	incentives	than	the	Soviet	system.	Soviet	SOEs	had	poor	incentives	to	fulfil	targets	because	wages	were
flat	and	target	fulfilment	prompted	an	increased	target	in	the	following	year	for	no	additional	reward.	PSI	firms	are
incentivised	by	their	stock-holding	executive	pay	and	financing	structures	and	by	the	incompleteness	of	contractual
specifications	to	actively	‘sweat’	a	contract,	since	beyond	creative	accounting	measures,	their	profit	margins	originate
in	its	strictly	legal,	plain	text	reading.
The	tougher	any	government	tries	to	be	in	contract	pricing	within	incomplete	contracts	the	more	damaging	the
consequences	of	margin-seeking	by	the	firm	are	likely	to	prove.	The	risk	under	austerity	is	of	chronic	adverse
selection.	Given	the	objective	difficulty	of	establishing	accurate	pricing	under	incomplete	contracting,	only	the	most
reckless	firms	with	least	regard	for	service	quality	and	those	most	determined	to	deploy	later	strategies	of	‘hold	up’
will	rationally	underbid	for	contracts	with	no	guarantee	they	can	stay	within	the	initial	margins.	The	collapsed	Carillion
was	just	such	a	repeat	‘winner’.	Carillion’s	management	acted	rationally	under	prevailing	incentive	structures:	they
were	aberrant	only	in	misjudging	the	moment	when	the	financial	markets	would	baulk	at	the	unsustainability	of	their
value	extraction.
The	standard	counter-argument	to	‘the	problem	of	monopoly’	is	that	the	reputational	effect	on	dominant	firms	acts	as
a	disciplining	guarantee	against	poor	contractual	behaviour.	But	in	monopoly/duopoly	public	service	industry	markets
with	high	barriers	to	entry	under	doctrinaire	governments	who	are	increasingly	structurally	dependent	on	the	survival
of	the	dominant	firms,	the	reputational	damage	to	even	atrocious	providers	is	apparently	nil.	A	Public	Accounts
Select	Committee	investigation	found	that	Serco	and	G4S	were	awarded	fourteen	new	contracts	by	five	Departments
worth	£350	million	even	as	they	were	being	investigated	by	the	Serious	Fraud	Office	for	defrauding	the	Ministry	of
Justice	and	after	the	then	Justice	Minister,	Chris	Grayling,	publicly	committed	to	withhold	awards	until	the	case	was
resolved:	the	MoJ	was	among	the	five.
The	current	UK	government	nevertheless	continues	to	drive	outsourcing	into	the	state’s	most	complex	and	socially
essential	service	domains.	It’s	enough	to	make	Leonid	Brezhnev	blush.
This	article	is	based	on	the	author’s	recent	LEQS	working	paper
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